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[L.A. No. 24909. In Bank. Aug. 29, 1958.] 
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GAS COMPANY (a Corpora-
tion), Respondent, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Ap-
pellant. 
[1] Gas-Franchises.-Where a gas company 10llatE's its lines in a 
eounty pursuant to a franchise from the eounty, such fran-
ehise eonstitutes a eontract secured by the United States 
Constitution against impairment by subsequent state legisla-
tion, and the eompany's rights thereunder eannot be taken or 
damaged for public use cwithout just eompensation. (Cal. 
Const., art. I, § 14; U:S. Const., Amend. 14, § 1.) 
[2] Streets-Franchises.-In the absence of a provision to the 
eontrary, a public utility accepts franchise rights in public 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Gas Companies, § 3; Am.Jm., Gas Compa-
nies, § 6 et seq. 
[2J See Cal.Jur.2d, Highways and Streets, §§ 204, 205. 
McB:. Dig. References: [lJ Gas, § 2; [2-6,8-10] Streets, § 44; [7] 
Municipal Corporations, § 48. 
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streets subject to an implied obligation to relocate its facili-
ties therein at its own expense when necessary to make way for 
proper governmental use of the streets. 
[3] Id.-Franchises.-The laying of sewers is a governmental as . 
distinct from a proprietary function under the rule that a • 
public utility accepts franchise rights in public streets subject I 
to. an implied obligation to relocate its facilities therein at its 
own expense when necessary to make way for proper govern-
mental use. 
[4] Id.-Franchises.-Implied obligations of a gas eompany in its 
county franchise to relocate its pipes may be invoked for the 
benefit of a city operating outside of its territorial limits ; such 
obligations rest on the paramount right of the people as a 
whole to use the public streets wherever located, and the fact 
that a franchise is granted by one political subdivision as an 
agent of the state does not defeat the right of another such 
agent acting in its governmental eapacity to invoke the publie 
right for the public benefit. 
[6] Id.-Franchises.-The fact that a eity's use of county streets 
for its sewers is authorized by Pub. UtiI. Code, § 10101, has 
no bearing on the applicability of the rule that a public utility 
aecepts franchise rights in public streets subjeet to an implied 
obligation to relocate its facilities therein at its own expense 
when necessary to make way for proper governmental use of 
the streets. 
[6] Id.-Franchises.-WhiIe rights granted municipal corporations 
by Pub. UtiI. Code, I 10101, to use the streets for their sewers 
constitute franchises subjeet to the paramount right of the 
state to make the streets safe for public travel, a franehise 
exercised by a city in its governmental capacity under that 
eection is not subordinate to a prior franchise granted a public 
utility. 
(7) Municipal Oorporations-Extraterritorial Powers.-A eity's 
use of streets for its sewers is one of its most important gov-
ernmental powers, and may be exercised outside its territorial 
limits without express authorization. 
[8] Streets-Franchises.-WhiIe the right of municipal corpora-
tions to require utilities to relocate their lines to make way 
for governmental uses of the streets is usually described as 
resting in the police power and it is frequently stated that 
such power eannot be bargained away, there appears to be no 
basic principle that would prohibit granting a utility a right 
to compensation for relocating its lines as part of its fran-
ehise although such right would not otherwise pass. 
[7] See Oal . .Tur.2d, Municipal Corporations, § 198; Am • .Tur., 
Municipal Corporations, 11122, 194, 284. 
·) 
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[9] Id.-Franchis88.-As a public grant, a coUnty franchise auth-
orizing a gas company to locate its lines in the public streets 
is to be construed in favor of the public interest. 
[10] Id.-Franchiscs.-Though a county franchise authorizing a 
gas company to locate its lines in the public streets expressly 
recites t~at the county reserves the right to change the grade 
of any highway over which the franchise is granted "and the 
grantee of said franchise, its successors or assigns, shall at 
once change the location of all pipes and other appliances laid 
hereunder to conform to such change of grade," this did not 
exclude other similar obligations, and the maxim el%fW"sW 
u.ius Bl%cluBio aZterius BSt cannot be invoked to make plain and 
unambiguous the company's right to eompensation for the 
eost of relocating lines necessitated by the construction of new 
sewer lines by a city outside its territorial limits ; the franchise 
provision cannot reasonably be interpreted as being more than 
a partial expression of the parties' common-law rights and 
obligations inserted out of an abundance of caution or by way 
of example. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Philbrick McCoy, JUdge. Reversedwith 
directions. 
Action by gas company against a city for cost of relocating 
gas lines. Judgment for plaintiff reversed with directions. 
Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney, Bourke Jones, .Assistant 
City Attorney, and Claude E. Hilker, Deputy City Attorney, 
for Appellant. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los Angeles), and 
Edward H. Gaylord, Deputy County Counsel, as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Appellant. 
T. J. Reynolds, L. T. ~ce, Allen L. Cleveland, C. R. Salter, 
Bates Booth, Arville.A;'Armstrong, Jr., and Gertrude Green-
gard for Respondent. 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Norman S. Sterry, Ira C. Powers, 
Martin E. Whelan, Jr., F. T. Searls, P. E. Sloane, W. E. Johns 
and R. A. Clarke as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-The city of Los Angeles constructed the 
La Cienega and San Fernando Relief Sewer as part of a sewer 
construction program. A short section of this sewer line 
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passes under a narrow strip of land known as the County 
Strip located outside the city limits in an unincorporated 
area of the county of Los Angeles. To construct the sewer , 
it was necessary to relocate gas lines of the Southern Cali- : 
fornia Gas Company. The company agreed to relocate its gas 
lines in the County Strip subject to a later determination 
of its obligation to do so at its own expense. It conceded its 
obligation to relocate its lines at its own expense within the 
city limits but denied that it had the same obligation with 
respect to its lines located in the County Strip. After the 
work was completed it brought this action against the city to 
recover the costs incurred in relocating its County Strip 
lines and recovered judgment for $12,003.92 plus interest. 
The city appeals. 
[1] The company located its lines in the county pursuant 
to a county franchise. It is not disputed that this franchise 
constitutes a contract secured by the United States Constitu-
tion against impairment by subsequent state legislation (see 
County of Los Angeles v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Ca1.2d 
378, 382 [196 P.2d 773]) and that the company's rights there-
under can not be taken or damaged for public use without 
making just compensation. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 14; U.S. 
Const., Amend. 14, § 1; Rt/SSell v. Sebastian, 233 U.S. 195 
[34 S.Ot. 517,58 L.Ed. 912, L.R.A. 1918E 882] ; United States 
v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 168 F.2d 391, 394; City of Peta-
luma v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 44 Ca1.2d 284, 288 (282 P.2d 
43] .) Accordingly it is necessary to determine what those 
rights are. 
[2] In the absence of a provision to the contrary it has 
generally been held that a public utility accepts franchise 
rights in public streets subject to an implied obligation to 
relocate its facilities therein at its own expense when necessary 
to make way for a proper governmental use of the streets. 
(New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Com., 197 U.S. 453, 
461-462 [25 8.Ct. 471, 49 L.Ed. 831] ; Chicago B. & Q. Rail-
way v.Illinois, 200 U.S. 561,586 [26 S.Ot. 341, 50 L.Ed. 596] ; 
Transit Corll. v. Long Island R. Co., 253 N.Y. 345 [171 N.E. 
565, 566] ; Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Commonwealth, 
(Ky.) 266 S.W.2d 308, 310; Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. 
Co. v. Staie, (Fla.) 75 So.2d 796, 800; Western Gas Co. 
of Washingt011 v. City of Bremerton, 21 Wn.2d 907 [153 P.2d 
846,847] ; In re Delaware R1ver Joint Com., 342 Pa. 119 [19 
A.2d 278, 280] ; Natick Gaslight Co. v. Inhabitants of Natick, 
175 Mass. 246 [56 N.E. 292, 293] ; Opinion of the J,tsticcs, 
) 
) 
;:Aug.1.958]SOUTBEBN CAL. GAS Co. 41. 'ern :.()F.L.·A.. "1117 
{l0 C.1d 713: 321 P.lId I8Ill 
-- Me. -- {132 A.2d 440, 443]; Opinion of the Jtu-
lices, - N.H. - [132 A.2d 613, 614].} [3] The laying 
of sewers is a governmental as distinct from a proprietary 
function under the foregoing rule. (Detroit Edison Co. v. 
City of Detroit, 332 Mich. 348 [51 N.W.2d 245, 247-248]; 
Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Commissioners of Sewerage of 
Louisville, 236 Ky. 376 [33 S.W.2d 344, 344-345] ; Nicholas Di 
Metl1la & Sons v. City of New York, 114 N.Y.S.2d 347, 350; 
Portlafld Gas &- Coke Co. v. Giebisclt, 84 Ore. 632 {165 P. 1004, 
L.R.A. 1917E 1092]; City of San Antonio v. San Ant071io St. 
By. Co., 15 Tex. Civ. App. 1 [39 S.W. 136, 138] ; Anderson v. 
Fuller, 51 Fla. 380 [41 So. 684, 688, 120 Am.St.Rep. 170, 6 
L.R.A.N.S. 1026]; National Water-Works Co. v. City of Kan-
sas,28 F. 921, 922-923; cf. City of Los Aflgeles v. Los Angeles 
Gas &- Elec. Corp., 251 U.S. 32,39-40 [40 S.Ct. 76, 64 L.Ed_ 
121] ; State ex rel. Speeth v. Carney, 163 Ohio St. 159 [126 
N.E.2d 449, 460] ; Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. City de County of 
San Francisco, 53 Cal.App. 188, 192-193 [199 P. 1108].) 
Panhandle etc. Co. v. State Highway Com., 294 U.S. 613 155 
S.Ct. 563, 79 L.Ed. 1090], is not to the contrary, for in that 
case the utility's private right of way was involved, not its 
right to use the public streets. 
[4] The company contends, however, that any implied obli-
gations in its county franchise to relocate its pipes cannot be 
invoked for the benefit of the city operating outside its terri-
torial limits. We cannot agree with this contention. Such 
obligations rest on the paramount right of the people as a 
"vhole to use the public streets wherever located, and the 
fact that a franchise is granted by one political subdivision 
as an agent of the state (see San Francisco-Oakland Terminal 
By&. v. County of Alameda, 66 Cal.A.pp. 77, 83 [225 P. 304] ; 
Belfast Water Co. v. City of Belfast, 92 Me. 52 [42 A.. 235, 
237]) does not defeat the right of another such agent acting 
ill its govcrnmental capac~ty to invoke the public right for 
the public benefit. (Fir.,t Nat. Baflk of Boston v. Main Turn-
pike Auth., 153 Me. ~31 [136 A..2d 699, 711] ; City of San 
Antonio v. Bexar Metropolitan W. Dist., (Tex. Civ. App.) 
309 S.W.2d 491, 493; Cummins v. City of Seymour, 'l1 Ind. 
491 [41 Am.Rep. 618, 623-625] ; New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. 
Draiflage Com., 111 La. 838 [35 So. 929, 933] ; see Gadd v. 
McQuire, 69 Cal.A.pp. 347, 358-359 [231 P.2d 754].} [5] The 
fact that the city's use of county streets for, its sewers is 
authorized by section 10101 of the Public Utilities Code has no 
bearing on the applicability of the foregoing rule. [6] It is 
) 
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true that the rights granted to municipal corporations by 
that section have been held to constitute franchises subject 
to the paramount right of the state to make the streets safe for 
public travel (State v. Marin Mun. W. Did., 17 Ca1.2d 699, 
703-704 [111 P.2d 651]), but it does not follow that a fran-
chise exercised by a city in its governmental capacity under 
that section is subordinate to a prior franchise granted to a 
public utility. The utility involved in the Marin case was a 
municipal water district operating in a proprietary capacity. 
(See City of South Pasadena v. Pasadena Land etc. Co., 152 
Cal. 579, 592-593 [93 P. 490].) [71 In the present case, on 
the other hand, the city is exercising one of its most important 
governmental powers, a power so important that it is one of 
the few powers it may exercise outside of its territorial limits 
without express authorization. (Harden v. Superior Court, 
44 Cal.2d 630, 638-639 [284 P.2d 9] ; MuZville v. City of San 
Diego, 183 Cal. 734, 737 [192 P. 702]; McBean v. City of 
Fresno, 112 Cal. 159, 163 [44 P. 358, 53 Am.St.Rep. 191, 31 
L.R.A. 794]; see also City of National City v. Fritz, 33 Cal.2d 
635, 637 [204 P.2d 7] ; City of Madera v. Black, 181 Cal. 306, 
312-313 [184 P. 397].) The Marin case itself recognized and 
applied the established rqle that a utility's rights in the public 
streets are taken subject to the paramount right of public 
travel, and as stated above, the same rule applies between 
public utilities and municipal corporations using the streets 
for sewer purposes. 
The company contends, however, that the express terms of 
its county franchise define its obligation to relocate its lines 
at its own expense and that by clear implication any other 
similar obligations are excluded. Section 8 of its franchise 
provides that "the County of Los Angeles reserves the right 
to change the grade of any highway over which this franchise 
is granted, and the grantee of said franchise, its successors or 
assigns, shall at on<le change the location of all pipes and other 
appliances laid hereunder to conform to such change of grade. " 
The city contends that the recital of the obligation to relocate 
the gas lines for changes of grade does not exclude other im-
plied obligations to relocate lines and that any attempt to 
relieve the company of such obligations would be invalid. 
[8] The right of municipal corporations to require utilities 
to relocate their lines to make way for governmental uses of 
the streets has usually been described as resting in the police 
power, and it has frequently been stated in this context that 
the police power cannot be bargained away. (National Water-
) 
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Works Co. v. City 01 Kansas, 28 F.921, 922-923; City of 
Macon v. Southern Bell Tel. ff Tel. Co., 89 Ga. App. 252 [79 
S.E.2d 265, 275] ; Belfast Water Co. v. City of Belfast, 92 
Me. 52 [42 A. 235, 237] ; Louisville City Ry. Co. v. City of 
Louisville, 71 Ky. (8 Bush) 415, 422-423; Scranton Gas ff 
Water Co .. v. City of Scranton, 214 Pa. 586 [64 A. 84, 85, 
6 L.R.A.N.S. 1033] ; Louisville Gas &- Electric Co. v. Commis-
sioners 01 Sewerage of Louisville, 236 Ky. 376 [33 S.W.2d 
344,344-345] ; see New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Com., 
197 U.S. 453, 460 [25 S.Ct. 471, 49 L.Ed. 831].) Given, 
however, the municipal power to vacate streets or acquire a 
lesser interest in them in the first instance than is usually 
obtained by the public (see Pennsylt'ania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 
260 U.S. 393,416 [43 S.Ct.158, 67 L.Ed. 322, 28 A.L.R. 1321] ; 
Detro·it Edison Co. v. City of Detroit, 332 Mich. 348 [51 N.W. 
2d 245, 247-248]), there would appear to be no basic principle 
that would prohibit granting a utility a right to compensation 
for relocating its lines as part of its franchise although such 
right would not otherwise pass. This view finds support in 
cases holding that the Legislature may provide for such com-
pensation. (In re Gillen Place, Bor01tgh of Brooklyn, 304 
N.Y. 215 [106 N.E.2d 897, 900] ; Baltimore Gas &- Electric 
Co. v. State Roads Com., 214 Md. 266 [134 A.2d 312, 315] ; 
Philadelphia Sub. W. Co. v. Pennsylvania P. U. Com., 168 
Pa. Super. 360 [78 A.2d 46, 51-52] ; Opinion of the Justices, 
_. - Me. -- [132 A.2d 440, 443]; Opinion 01 the Jus-
tices, -- N.H. -- [132 A.2d 613, 614-615] ; see Columbus 
Gaslight ff Coke Co. v. City of Columbus, 50 Ohio St. 65 [33 
N.E. 292, 293, 40 Am.St.Rep. 648, 19 L.R.A. 510].)- Per-
haps this apparent conflict can be reconciled on the theory 
that a state Legislature may authorize franchises granting the 
utility the right to compensation for relocating its lines to 
make way for governmental uses, but that it will not be held 
to have delegated such power );0 a political subdivision in the 
absence of express language to that effect. It is unnecessary 
to determine, however, whether the county was empowered to 
grant a franchise including the right to the compensation here 
sought, for we have concluded that properly interpreted the 
company's franchise included no such right. 
[9] As a public grant the franchise is to be construed in 
-It should be noted that we are not here concerned with the question 
of the power of the Legislature to grant additional rights under a 
franchise after it has been accepted by the utility and the problem 
that would be raised thereby of a possible gift of pubJic funds. 
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favor of the public interest. (Knoxville Water Co. v. Knox-
1Jille, 200 U.S. 22, 33-34 [26 S.Ct. 224, 50 L.Ed. 353] ; County 
of Los A.'ngeles v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Cal.2d 378, 384 
[196 P.2d 773] ; City of Sacramento v. Pacific Gas & Electric 
Co., 173 Cal. 787, 791 [161 P. 978] ; Civ. Code § 1069.) Its 
own terms provide that it "is hereby granted upon each and 
every condition herein contained, and shall ever be strictly con-
strued against the grantee and its successors and assigns. 
Nothing shall pass hereby unless it be granted in plain and 
unambiguous terms." [10] The maxim expressiounius ex-
clusio altenus est cannot be invoked to make plain and unam-
biguous the right to compensation that the company seeks. 
Given the parties' express recognition of the rule of strict 
construction against the grantee, paragraph 8 cannot reason-
ably be interpreted as being more than a partial expression 
of the parties ' common-law righto; and obligations (City of 
Los Angeles v. City of Gle11dale, 23 Cal.2d 68, 77 [142 P.2d 
289] ; Strand Improvement Co. v. City of Long Beach, 173 
Cal. 765, 772-773 [161 P. 975]) inserted out of an abundance 
of caution or by way of example only. (City of Lexington v. 
Comme.rcial Bank, 130 Mo. App. 687 (108 S.W. 1095, 1096] ; 
Georgia Power Co. v. Leonard, 187 Ga. 608 [1 S.E.2d 579, 
581] ; see also Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189. 
206 [48 S.Ct. 480, 72 L.Ed. 845] ; Dickey v. Raisin Proration 
Zone No.1, 24 Ca1.2d 796, 811 [151 P.2d 505, 157 A.L.R. 
324].) Thus, the New York Court of Appeals has pointed 
out that despite the existence of express provisions dealing 
with the utility '8 obligations with respect to the streets "The 
reasonable construction ... is to assume that the people are not 
to be burdened with any heavier expense than necessity re-
quires, and that to relieve the public service corporations 
having franchises in the streets of their common-law liabili-
ties and to pass them over to the taxpayer can only be accom-
plished by the express direction of the Legislature." (Transit 
Commission v. Long Island R. Co., 253 N.Y. 345 [171 N.E. 
565,568] ; see also New York Tunnel Authority v. Consolidated 
Edison Co., 295 N.Y. 467 [68 N.E.2d 445, 448-449].) Chicago 
v. Sheldon, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 50 [19 L.Ed. 594], State ex reI. 
City of Kansas v. Corriga·n C011sol. Street Ry. Co., 85 Mo. 263 
[55 Am.Rep. 361], City of Kansas v. Corrigan, 86 Mo. 67, 
and Western Union Tel. Co. v. Police Jury, 225 La. 531 [73 
So.2d 450], are not to the contrary. The first three of these 
cases involved, not competing uses of the streets, but the 
extent of the utility's duty to repair and repave the streets, 
) 
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a matter covered by the' express terms of the franchise~ and 
in the Sheldon case the court's interpretation was in accord 
with the practical construction placed on the franchise by 
the parties. In the fourth case, the competing public use 
was so highly unusual that it could not have been contemplated 
at the time the franchise was accepted. In the present case, 
on the contrary, the use of the streets for sewers was clearly 
to be anticipated, the utility's common-law obligation to relo-
cate its pipes to accommodate that use has at all times been 
clearly recognized by the law, and there is no provision in 
the company's franchise abrogating that obligation by giving 
it the right to recover the costs of such relocation. 
The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court 
to enter judgment for the defendant city. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J., Concurring.-Although I agree with the 
conclusion reached in the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice 
Traynor, for the reasons hereinafter stated, I regret my inabil-
ity to join in said opinion. 
My views with respect to the application of article I, section 
14, of the Constitution of California to the ordinary situation 
in which private property has been taken or damaged for a 
public use, have been stated many times in both majority, 
dissenting and concurring opinions which I have written as a 
member of this court (Rose v. 8tate, 19 Ca1.2d 713 [123 P.2d 
505] ; Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Ca1.2d 343 [144 P.2d 
818] ; Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19, 29 [119 
P.2d 1] ; O'Hara v. Los Angeles County Flood etc. Dist., 19 
Ca1.2d 61, 64 [119 P.2d 23] ; House v. Los Angeles County 
Flood Control Dist., 25 Ca1.2d 384, 398 [153 P.2d 950]; 
Clement v. 8tate Reclamation Board, 35 Cal.2d 628, 646 [220 
P.2d 897]). It will be noted that in all of the cases above 
cited it was the position of the public agency which took the 
property or caused damage thereto, that the taking or dam-
aging was done under the police power reserved to the state 
and its political subdivisions by article XI, section 11, of the 
Constitution of California. I did not agree with this conten-
tion, and my position in this regard is the same now as it was 
then. This is the first case since I have been a member of 
this court, in which, in my opinion, the police power doctrine 
was applicable to the facts of the case presented. A review 
of the above-cited cases reveals a state of confusion in the 
) 
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minds of some members of this court with respect to the 
situations in which the police power doctrine may be invoked I 
by the state or a political subdivision thereof to take, damage 
or destroy private property without the payment of compen-
sation therefor in contravention of article I, section 14, of the 
Constitution of California. (See Rose v. State, supra; Bacich 
v. Board of Oontrol, supra; Archer v. Oity of Los Angeles, 
supra; O'Hara v. Los Angeles Oounty Flood etc. Dist., supra; 
House v. Los Angeles Oounty Flood Oontrol Dist., supra; 
Olement v. State Reclamation Board, supra; Beals v. Oity of 
Los Angeles, 23 Ca1.2d 381 [144 P .2d 839] ; People v. Ricciardi, 
23 Ca1.2d 390 [144 P.2d 799].) A reading of the last-cited 
cases including the dissenting and concurring opinions therein 
demonstrates the truth of my statement with respect to the 
confusion which has existed in the minds of some members of 
this court in attempting to distinguish cases involving the 
application of article I, section 14 (eminent domain), of the 
Constitution and cases involving the application of article XI, 
section 11 (police power), of the Constitution of California. 
The opinion prepared by :Mr. Justice Traynor in this case 
adds to that confusion, as he fails to differentiate between 
the powers granted to the state and its political subdivisions 
under the last two cited constitutional provisions. Said opin-
ion states: "In the present case, on the other hand, the city 
is exercising one of its most important governmental powers, 
a power so important that it is one of the few powers it may 
exercise outside of its territorial limits without express auth-
orization." He then cites Harden v. Superior Oourt, 44 Cal. 
2d 630 [284 P.2d 9], which is a case involving power of emi-
nent domain. Later in his opinion, he states: "The right of 
municipal corporations to require utilities to relocate their 
lines to make way for governmental uses of the streets has 
usually been described as resting in the police power, and it 
has frequently been stated in this context that the police power 
cannot be bargained away." The cases he cites here correctly 
apply the police power doctrine. 
In said opinion, :Mr. Justice Traynor also discusses the 
power of the Legislature to provide for the payment of 
compensation in cases such as this, but this proposition is not 
involved here because it is conceded that the Legislature made 
no such provision. This discussion is therefore obiter dictum. 
There is really no need for the confusion which now exists 
in the decisions of this court which have had occasion tv 
apply article I, section 14, and article XI, section 11, of the 
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Constitution of California to particular factual situations as 
there is a clear distinction between the power of eminent do-
main and the police power granted by said constitutional pro-
visions. It may be true that there is a twilight zone where the 
line of demarcation between the exercise of the power of 
eminent domain and the exercise of the police power is diffi· 
cult to discern, but in view of the very clear pronouncements 
of the Supreme Court of the United States in this field, this is 
not such a case. I say this, notwithstanding my predilection to 
hold otherwise before reading the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States applicable to the facts of this case. 
(New Orleans Gaslight 00. v. Drainage Com., 197 U.S. 453 
[25 8.Ct. 471,49 L.Ed. 831] ; Ohicago, Burlington etc. R. R. 
00. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 [17 S.Ct. 581, 41 L.Ed. 979]; 
Ohicago B. & O. Ry. 00. v. Illinois Oommrs., 200 U.S. 561 [26 
8.Ct. 341, 50 L.Ed. 596]; New York & N. E. Railroad 00. v. 
Bristol, 151 U.S. 556 [14 S.Ct. 437, 38 L.Ed. 269] ; Butchers' 
Union etc. 00. v. Orescent Oity etc. Co., 111 U.S. 746 [4 S.Ct. 
652, 28 L.Ed. 585]; Btone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 [25 
L.Ed. 1079] ; New Orleans Gaslight 00. v. Louisiana Light etc. 
00.,115 U.S. 650, 671 [6 S.Ct. 252, 29 L.Ed. 516].) In view 
of these decisions, we have here a very simple case which 
should be disposed of by an opinion free from the confusion 
and dictum which permeates many of the other decisions of 
this court in this field. For the sake of clarity only, I have 
prepared an opinion which correctly states and disposes of the 
issues in this case in accordance with the rules of law as 
declared by the Supreme Court of the United States to be 
applicable to the factual situation presented here. 
Defendant, city of Los Angeles, a municipal corporation, 
appeals from a judgment awarding compensation to plaintiff, 
Southern California Gas Company, a corporation, for its costs 
in relocating its gas lines. The case was tried on an agreed 
statement of facts. ,~ 
The city of Los Angeles, hereinafter referred to as the city, 
began a sewer construction program, one of the main part.'> 
of which was the construction of the "La Cienega and San 
Fernando Valley Relief Sewer." This sewer carries sewage 
from the San Fernando Valley to a spot near La Cienega 
Boulevard where it meets with the Hyperion disposal plant 
line. A small portion of this sewer line passes under a narrow 
strip of land known as the County Strip which is located out-
side the c~ty limits but within an unincorporated area in the 
) 
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county of Los Angeles. A portion of the proposed sewer 
underlying public streets in the County Strip was OC<:Ujll.1!(( 
by the gas lines of the Southern California Gas Company • .ueJr~·.1fJl. 
inafter called the company. The company agreed to reloCII~te~ 
its gas lines in the County Strip to make way for the 
mains subject to a later determination of its obligation to 
so at its own expense. The company conceded its obl[i~llti(m 
to relocate its lines at its own expense within the city ...... .u .. ,;~j 
but denied that it had the same obligation with respect to 
lines located in the County Strip. Judgment was 
favor of plaintiff company in the sum of $12,003.92, to,~etltler 
with interest thereon at the rate of 7 per cent from March', 
1955. The city appeals. 
The city argues that a public utility, such as VU'Lll.lI~"'. 
obligated to relocate at its own expense its facilities n, n(JI~l'·,;a: 
lying public streets within an unincorporated portion of 
county to make way for a public improvement being install~ 
therein by the city. The major points here involved are'i 
whether the installation and maintenance of sewers by a mu- ' 
nicipality for the protection of the public health is an exercise 
of the police power; whether the police power of the state is 
being exercised by a municipality when it constructs con-
necting sewers beyond its boundaries; and whether the reloca-
tion of gas lines, at the company's expense, constitutes a tak-, 
ing of private property without compensation within :the 
meaning of the constitutional prohibitions. 
There can be no doubt at this time but that the installation 
and maintenance of sewers in the interests of the public health 
by a municipality is an exercise of the police power. In 
Harter v. Barkley, 158 Cal. 742, 744, 745 [112 P. 556], it was 
held that "The regulation of the right of laying sewers in 
public streets is unquestionably a power conferred upon 
municipalities, partly by virtue of the provisions of section 
11 of article XI of the constitution of California. The proper 
protection of the public health depends very largely upon 
the maintenance of a thorough and sanitary sewer system ... '. 
It has been held, and we think very properly, that ordinances 
of a municipal corporation providing for the construction, 
maintenance, and repairs of sewers and drains are to be sus- ! 
tained as a valid exercise of police power." "Regulation by . 
ordinance of methods and devices for the conveyance of sew-
age from private dwellings in municipalities is recognized as ' 
an exercise of that branch of the police power which pertains 
to the public health .... " (In re Nicholls, 74 Cal.App. 504, 
) 
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507 [241 P. 399] ; and see Sullivan v. Oity of Los Angeles, 116 
Cal.App.2d 807, 811 [254 P.2d 590].) 
The city contends that it is exercising the police power of 
the state when it constructs sewers beyond its boundaries and 
that it is authorized to do so by section 10101 of the Public 
Uti1ities Code and by its city charter. Section 10101, Public 
Utilities Code, provides: "There is granted to every munici-
pal corporation of the State the right to construct, operate, 
and maintain water and gas pipes, mains and conduits, electric 
light and power lines, telephone and telegraph lines, sewers 
and sewer mains, aU with the necessary appurtenances, across, 
along, in, under, over, or upon any road, street, alley, avenue, 
or highway, and across, under, or over any railway, canal, 
ditch, or flume which the route of such works intersects, 
crosses, or runs along, in such manner as to afford security for 
life and property." 
The Los Angeles City Charter provides (§ 2(6» that the 
city shall be empowered "To make and enforce within its 
limits all such local, police, sanitary, safety, welfare and other 
regulations as are not in con:ftict with general laws, and to 
exercise such jurisdiction outside its limits in such manner as 
may be authorized by law." (Emphasis added.) 
In Mulville v. Oity of San Diego, 183 Cal. 734, 737 [192 
P. 702], it was said: "In general, a municipality is competent 
to act beyond its boundaries only in those cases in which it 
is so empowered by legislative authority and it is necessary, 
in passing upon the validity of acts of a municipality per-
formed beyond its boundaries, to look to the general laws and 
municipal charter for the requisite authority. In certain in-
stances, owing to the urgency of extreme expediency or 
necessity, express authority is dispensed with and the power 
of the municipality to perform certain acts beyond its bound-
ary is implied as incidental to the existence of other powers 
expressly granted. Thus it has been held that, where a 
municipality has power to construct sewers, it may, as an 
implied incident to such power, extend the same beyond its 
boundaries when necessary or manifestly desirable. (McBean 
v. Oity of Fresno, 112 Cal. 159 [53 Am.St.Rep. 191, 31 L.R.A. 
794, 44 P. 358] ; Oity of Ooldwater v. Tucker, 36 Mich. 474; 
Oochran v. Village of Park Ridge, 138 Ill. 295 [27 N.E. 939] ; 
4 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, sec. 1434.)" (Ebritc 
v. Orawford, 215 Cal. 724, 728-729 [12 P.2d 937]; In f'C 
Blois, 179 Cal. 291, 295 [176 P. 449]; Raynor v. Oity of 
Arcata, 11 Cal.2d 113, 120 [77 P.2d 1054].) In In f'e Blois, 
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179 Cal. 291, 296 [176 P. 449], we said that we were "dispoS~d·:. 
to agree" and "to concede that municipalities may exercise <~ 
certain extraterritorial powers when the possession and exer-' 
cise of such powers are essential to the proper conduct of the 
affairs of the municipality. As for example, this court has 
held that a municipality has power to construct and maintain 
a 'system of waterworks outside of its boundaries for the 
supply of its inhabitants with water, and that it might even go 
to the extent of supplying water to persons living without the 
limits of spch municipality. (South Pasadena v. Pasadena ,3 
Land etc. Co., 152 Cal. 579 [93 P. 490].)" "',i\i 
It clearly appears that the city was exercising the police ,; 
power of the state by express grant of power as set forth 
in section 10101 of the Public Utilities Code as augmented ", 
by the provisions of its own charter and, that even had there 
not been such an express grant of power, the authority would 
be implied from the nature of the work undertaken under 
the police power. There can be no question but that it was 
imperative that the city's sewage disposal system connect with 
the Hyperion disposal plant and that such an exercise of 
the police power would have carried with it, by necessary 
implication, the power to act without its boundaries in making 
the connection. As we said in McBean v. City of Fresno, 112 
Cal. 159, 163 [44 P. 358, 53 Am.St.Rep. 191, 31 L.R.A. 794], 
where disposition of the outfall of the sewage system outside 
the city limits was involved, •• Proper sewers are in this day 
so essential to the hygiene and sanitation of a municipality, 
that a court would not look to see whether a power to construct 
and maintain them had been granted by the charter, but 
rather only to see whether by possibility the power had been 
expressly denied." 
The company contends that the city has neither a contrac-
tual right, nor the police power, to compel a utility to relocate 
its pipes without compensating the utility when both the pipes 
of the utility and the sewage system of the city are without 
the city limits. The company argues that its franchise from 
the county vested certain rights in it and contained only om' 
limitation-that of bearing the expense of relocation of its 
lines if the county changed the grade of any highway. In 
other words, it is contended that it$ rights under the fran-
chise from the county are by reason of tIle contract and are 
limited only by the terms of the contract. The city, on the 
other hand, maintains that the use by a public utility of 
public streets is subservient to the public use; that if the 
) 
Aug. 1958] SOUTHERN CAL. GAS CO. tI.CrrYoJ' L. A.. .:727 
[10 C.1d 713: 129 P.2d SII8) ._.. 
company's argument had merit it would mean that a city, or 
county, could impair or surrender its fundamental police 
power by contract. Thc city rclics upon the case of New 
Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Com., 197 U.S. 453 [25 
8.Ct. 471, 49 L.Ed. 831], in support of its position. The 
court there. said: "It is the contention of the plaintiff in 
error that, having acquired the franchise and availed itself 
of the right to locate its pipes under the streets of the city, 
it has thereby acquired a property right which cannot be taken 
from it by a shifting of some of its mains and pipes from their 
location to accommodate the drainage system, without com-
pensation for the cost of such changes. It is not contended 
that the gas company has acquired such a property right as 
will prevent the Drainage Commission, in the exercise of the 
police power granted to it by the State, from removing the 
pipes so as to make room for its work, but it is insisted that 
this can only be done upon terms of compensation for the 
cost of removal." The Supreme Court of the United States, 
speaking of the case of New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana 
Light etc. Co., 115 U.S. 650, 671 [6 8.Ct. 252, 29 L.Ed. 5161. 
said: "Except that the privilege was conferred to use the 
streets in laying the pipes in some places thereunder, there 
was nothing in the terms of the grant to indicate the intention 
of the State to give up its control of the public streets, cer-
tainly not so far as such power might be required by proper 
regulations to control their use for legitimate purposes con-
nected with the public health and safety." And, quoting from 
the same ease, it was said: " 'The constitutional prohibition 
upon state laws impairing the obligation of contracts does not 
restrict the power of the State to protect the public health, 
the public morals, or the public safety, as the one or the 
other may be involved in the execution of such contracts. 
Rights and privileges arising from contracts with a State are 
subject to regulations for the protection of the public health, 
the public morals, and the public safety, in the same sense, 
and to the same extent, as are all contracts and all property, 
whether owned by natural persons or corporations.'" Thc 
court further said: •• The drainage of a city in the interest of 
the public health and welfare is one of the most important 
purposes for which the police power can be exercised. The 
Drainage Commission, in carrying out this important work, 
it has been held by the Supreme Court of the State, is engaged 
in the execution of the police power of the State." And "It 
is admitted that in the exercise of this power there has been 
) 
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no more interference with the property of the gas company I 
than has been necessary to the carrying out of the drainage I 
plan. There is no showing tbat the value of the property of 
the gas company has been depreciated nor tbat it has suffered " 
any deprivation further than the expense which was rendered ! 
necessary by the changing of the location of the pipes to 
acco,mmodate the work of the Drainage Commission. The 
police power, insofar as its exercise is essential to the health 
of the community, it has been held cannot be contracted away. 
New York & N. E. Railroad 00. v. Bristol, 151 U.S. 556, 567 
[14 S.Ct. 437, 48 L.Ed. 269] ; Butchers' Union etc. Co. v. Ores-
cent City etc. Co., 111 U.S. 746, 751 [4 S.Ot. 652, 28 L.Ed. 
585] ; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 816 [25 L.Ed. 1079}. 
In a large city like New Orleans, situated as it is, and the 
entrepot of an extensive commerce coming from many foreign 
countries, it is of the highest importance that the public 
health shall be safeguarded by all proper means. It would 
be unreasonable to suppose that in the grant to the gas 
company of the right to use the streets in the laying of its 
pipes it was ever intended to surrender or impair the public 
right to discharge the duty of conserving the public health. 
The gas company did not acquire any specific location in the 
streets; it waS content with the general right to use them, 
and when it located its pipes it was at the risk that they might 
be, at some future time, disturbed, when the State might re-
quire for a necessary public use that changes in location be 
made ..•. 
.. The need of occupation of the soil beneath the streets 
in cities is constantly increasing, for the supply of water and 
light and the construction of systems of sewerage and drain-
age, and every reason of public policy requires that grants 
of rights in such sub-surface shall be held subject to such 
reasonable regulation as the public health and safety may 
require. There is nothing in the grant to the gas company, 
etlen if it cottld legally be done, undertaking to limit the right 
of the State to establish a system of drainage in the streets. 
We think whatever right the gas company acquired was sub-
ject insofar as the location of its pipes was concerned, to such 
future regulations as might be required in the interest of the I 
public health and welfare. These views are amply sustained 
by the authoritiell." (Emphasis added.) Speaking of Chi-
cago, Burlington etc. R. R. 00. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 254 
[17 S.Ct. 581, 41 L.Ed. 979], the court said: "In the latter I 
case it was held that uncompensated obediencet!> a regulation 
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enacted for the public safety under the police power of the 
State was not taking property without due compensation. In 
our view, that is all there is to this case. The gas company, 
by its grant from the city, acquired no exclusive right to the 
location' of its pipes in the streets, as chosen by it, under a 
general grant of authority to use the streets. The city made 
no contract that the gas company should not be disturbed 
in the location chosen. In the exercise of the police power 
of the State, for a purpose highly necessary in the promotion 
of the public health, it has become necessary to change the 
location of the pipes of the gas company so as to accommodate 
them to the new public work. In complying with this require-
ment at its own expense none of the property of the gas com-
pany has been taken, and the injury sustained is damnum 
absque injuria." 
Company argues that its franchise gave it vested rights 
which cannot be taken away without payment of compensation. 
In Russell v. Sebastian, 233 U.S. 195, 204 [34 S.Ct. 517, 58 
L.Ed. 912, L.R.A. 1918E 882], relied upon by company in 
support of its contention, a gas company operating under a 
provision of the Constitution of California sought to lay addi-
tional pipes in streets not theretofore used by it. The city of 
Los Angeles, by ordinance, prohibited, in effect, the use by the 
company of the streets not theretofore used by it. The Supreme 
Court held that the grant to the gas company which resulted 
from an acceptance of the state's offer constituted a contract 
and vested in the company a property right "protected by the 
Federal Constitution {is], not open to dispute in view of the 
repeated decisions of this court. " The effect of the municipal 
ordinance in the Russell case was to take away from the gas 
company its right to extend its mains and lines into additional 
streets in order to provide additional service to the people. 
No such rights are involved in the case at bar. We are here 
concerned merely with a relocation of existing lines in order 
to make way for a .sewage system being constructed for the 
benefit of the public. The company's vested property right 
here is to continue its lines and installations at some, rather 
than a specific, location within the public streets. By such a 
relocation, property "is not, within the meaning of the Con-
stitution, taken for public use, nor is the owner deprived of it 
without due process of law." (Chicago, B. &. Q. R. Co. v. 
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 [17 8.0t. 581, 4] L.Ed. 979].) In 
Chicago B. &- Q. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 605 [26 
8.0t. 341, 50 L.Ed. 596], the court said that it had "recognized 
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the principle that injury may often come to private property , 
as the result of legitimate governmental action, reasonably 
taken for the public good and for no other purpose, and yet 
there will be no taking of such property within the meaning of 
the constitutional guaranty against the deprivation of prop-
erty without due process of law, or against the taking of 
private property for public use without compensation. To 
this class belongs the recent, and as we think, decisive case of 
New Orleans GasUght Co. v. Drainage Commission . .•• " And, 
at pages 609, 610, "Upon the general subject there is no real 
con1lict among the adjudged cases. Whatever conflict there is 
arises upon the question whether there has been or will be 
in the particular case, within the true meaning of the Con-
stitution, a 'taking' of private property for public use. If 
the injury complained of is only incidental to the legitimate 
exercise of governmental powers for the public good, then there 
is no taking of property for the public use, and a right to 
compensation, on account of such injury, does not attach uuder 
the Constitution." 
The company .in support of its argument that its vested 
rights cannot be impaired without compensation also citt>.s 
the case of City 0/ Los A'IIgeles v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. 
Corp., 251 U.S. 32, 39 [40 S.Ct. 76, 64 L.Ed. 121], that "A 
franchise conveys rights, and if their exercise could be pre-
vented or destroyed by a simple declaration of a municipal 
council, they would be infirm indeed in tenure and substance. 
It is to be remembered that they came into existence by 
compact, having. therefore, its sanction, urged by reciprocal 
benefits, and are attended and can only be exercised by ex-
penditure of money, making them a matter of investments and 
property, and entitled as such against being taken without th~ 
proper process of law,-the payment of compensation." In 
the Los Angeles case, supra, a clear distinction exists which 
was specifically noted by the court: "what the city did was 
done not in its governmental capacity-an exercise of the 
police power-but in its • proprietary or quasi-private capacity' 
and that therefore the city was subordinate in right to the 
corporation, the latter being an earlier and lawful occupant 
of the field. The difference in the capacities is recognized and 
the difference in attendant powers pointed out in decisions 
of this court. Vilas v. Ma1ll1a, 220 U.S. 345 [31 S.Ct. 416, 
55 L.Ed. 491] ; Rttssell v. Sebastian, 233 U.S. 195 [34 S.Ct. 
517, 58 L.Ed. 912, L.R.A. 1918E 882]; South Caroli'lla v. 
Utlited States, 199 U.S. 437 [26 S.Ot. 110, 50 L.Ed. 261] ; New 
) 
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Orleans GtJ8Zight Co. v. Drainage Commission, 197 U.S. 453 
[25 S.Ct. 471, 49 L.Ed. 831] ; Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Water. 
works Co., 206 U.S. 496, 508 [27 S.Ct. 762, 51 L.Ed. 1155]." 
(251 U.S. at pp. 38, 39.) The city in the instant case was 
acting in its governmental capacity-in the exercise of police 
powers granted to it by the state-and in the interests of the 
public health and welfare. The city, in the Los Angeles case, 
supra, sought to establish a lighting system of its own. It 
was noted that the only question was "whether a city may as a 
matter of public right and without compensation clear a 
'space' for the instrumentalities of its system by removing or 
relocating the instrumentalities of other systems." (251 U.S. 
at p. 37.) It was specifically held: "It will be observed that 
we are not concerned with the duty of the corporation oper· 
ating a publie utility to yield uncompensated obedience to a 
police measure adopted for the protection of the public, but 
with a proposed uncompensated taking or disturbance of 
what belongs to one lighting system in order to make way for 
another. And this the Fourteenth Amendment forbids. What 
the grant was at its inception it remained and was not subject 
to be displaced by some other system, even that of the city, 
without compensation to the corporation for the rights appro-
priated." (251 U.S. at p. 40.) 
Company next argues that the state cannot inipair the obli-
gation of its contracts without compensation. From this argu-
ment company reasons that because its franchise contained 
only one condition-the relocation of its installations at itS own 
expense in the event of changes in the highway grade-no 
other conditions may be imposed. It will be recalled that 
this point was specifically considered in the case of New 
Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Commission, 197 U.S. 453 [25 
S.Ct.471,49 L.Ed. 831], where it was held that "The police 
,power, insofar as its exercise is essential to the health of the 
community, it has been held ~ilnot be contracted away" and 
that "There is nothing in the grant to the gas company, 6tlen 
if it could legally be done, undertaking to limit the right of 
the State to establish a system of drainage in the streets. We 
think whatever right the gas company acquired was subject 
insofar as the location of its pipes was concerned, to such 
future regulations as might be required in the interest of the 
public health and welfare." Company contends that the rules 
set forth in the New Orleans Gaslight case have been "dis-
posed of very tersely" by the case of Panhandle 'E. Pipeline 
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CO. v. State Highway Com., 294 U.S. 613 [55 S.Ct. 563, 79 . 
L.Ed. 1090]. The Panhandle case involved a Delaware cor-
poration which had obtained, by purchase, rights of ways 
from owners of property to construct and maintain conduits 
for transporting natural gas. In 1930 it purchased rights of 
way for pipes, auxiliary telephone lines, etc. After the pipes 
were in operation, the Highway Commission of Kansas, in 
1933, pursuant to statute adopted plans for new highways 
across the company's rights of way in several places. The 
state obtained permission from the owners of the fee to use 
the land obtained for the highways, but the company refused 
to permit the use of its right of way. The state court had 
held that the new highways were being constructed under 
the police power of the state and that the necessary relocation 
of the company's installations at company expense did not 
constitute a taking of private property without due process of 
law. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the 
state court holding (p. 619) that "A claim that action is 
being taken under the police power of the state cannot justify 
disregard of constitutional inhibitions." It can readily be 
seen that there are important distinctions between the Pan-
handle case and the New Orleans Gaslight case and the case 
at bar. In the Panhandle case the company had purchased 
rights of way from private owners of land for its installations. 
In the New Orleans Gaslight ease and the case at bar, the 
companies were granted permission to use the subsurface of 
public roads already in existence. In the Panhandle case, 
the state desired to construct new highways over the private 
rights of way previously acquired by the company. The 
acquisition of and construction of public highways does not 
come within the purview of the police power but is accom-
plished under the power of eminent domain embraced within 
section 14 of article I of the Constitution of the State of 
California. (See Rose v. State, 19 Ca1.2d 713 [123 P.2d 505] ; 
Beals v. City of Los .Angeles, 23 Ca1.2d 381 [144 P.2d 839] ; 
Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal.2d 343 [144 P.2d 818] ; 
People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390 [144 P.2d 799].) The 
Supreme Court of the United States did not overrule, either 
directly or indirectly, the New Orleans Gaslight case, but dis-
tinguished it as being within the purview of the exercise 
of the police power as follows: "New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. 
Drainage Commission, 197 U.S. 453 [49 L.Ed. 831, 258.Ct. 
471], and similar cases concerning pipes in public streets are 
not controlling. In them the pipes were laid upon agreement, 
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actual or implied, that the owner would make reasonable 
changes when directed by the municipality." (P. 623.) 
.It was specifically pointed out in the New Orleans Gaslight 
case that the police power of the sovereignty could not be con-
tracted away and that any franchise, such as we have under 
consideration here, must be considered, insofar as location of 
gas installations is concerned, to have been acquired subject 
to such future regulations as might be required in the interest 
of the public health and welfare. As the Supreme Court said 
in Chicago, BurUngton etc. B. B. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 
254 [17 S.Ct. 581,41 L.Ed. 979], "uncompensated obedience 
to a regulation enacted for the public safety under the police 
power of the state was not taking property without due com-
pensation. " This holding was again stated and approved in 
New Orleans Public 8ef'1Jice v. New Orleans, 281 U.S. 682, 
687 [50 S.Ct. 449, 74 L.Ed. 1115]. 
Both the city and company rely upon Merced Falls Gas 
etc. Co. v. Turner, 2 Cal.App. 720, 721, 723, '124 [84 P. 239], 
in support of their positions. The Merced case involved the 
relocation of some electric light poles on a city street. The 
company brought an action to enjoin the city and, after de-
clining to amend its complaint, judgment was entered upon 
defendant city's demurrers. The court noted that "The sole 
contention of appellant [company] in both appeals involves 
the power of the city authorities to compel or make the change 
in question.' 'The court, in holding that the city had the 
power to compel the relocation of the poles, said: "But the 
constitution, in providing for the exercise and enjoyment of 
the franchise owned by appellant [company], did not grant 
an absolute, indefeasible right or easement in the particular 
spots of earth where its poles were planted originally, nor 
does the grant contain a hint that the superintendent of 
streets, or other officer in control thereof, exhausted his juris-
diction or power to direct or control the use of the streets by 
appellant, when the poles were located in the first instance 
. . . and therefore such regulations, or the absence of them, 
cannot limit or annul the general power granted to the mu-
nicipality, to direct and control the manner in which the streets 
shall be used, and the franchise exercised. Courts will not 
hesitate to stay the arm of municipal power when any attempt 
to curtail or deny the constitutional right is made manifest 
or a clear abuse of discretion is shown. But they will as 
unhesitatingly frown upon the doctrine tbat the constitutional 
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.. "'~ provision in question must· be construed as an abdication or'] 
denial of power on the part of cities to widen, straighten,' 
beautify and improve streets and sidewalks, and to compel 
property owners of every class and kind to conform to all 
reasonable regulations redounding to the general good." Com-
pany relies on the following language from the same case: 
•• It may be contended that the averment of irreparable injury 
sufficiently shows that the regulation is unreasonable and con-
fiscatory. The damage which has already accrued is estimated 
at $1,000, and it is difficult to guess why the sum total of 
dllmage resulting from the removal of all the poles may not' 
be as easiJy estimated and compensated." From this com-
pany argues that the holding of the case is that the company 
tllere was entitled to damages accruing by reason of the relo-
cation of its poles. The case cannot be construed as contended 
for by company since the question of the cost of relocating 
the poles was not involved. The only contention made there 
was that the city did not have the power to compel the com-
pany to relocate its poles and any statement which did not 
bear upon that question is clearly dictum. Company cites 
many other cases in support of its position, none of which is 
in point. Btockton Gas etc. Co. v. Ban Joaquin County, 148 
Cal. 313 [83 P. 54, 7 Ann. Cas. 511, 5 L.R.A.N.S. 174], held 
that the situs where a franchise was used was where it was to 
be taxed; Matter of RtlBsell, 163 Cal. 668 [126 P. 875, Ann. 
Cas. 1914A 152]. held that a gas company had no vested 
rights in streets not previously used by it for the laying of 
gas mains; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hopkins, 160 Cal. 106 
(116 P. 557]. was concerned with the situs of a franchise as i 
taxable property; South Pasadena v. Pasadena Lana etc. Co., 
152 Cal. 579 (93 P. 490], involved the sale and transfer of a 
franchise for the supplying of water by a private corporation 
to a munil'ipal corporation ; County of Los Angeles v. Bouthern 
Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Cal.2d 378 [196 P.2d 773], involved an at-
tempt by the county to collect a tax from the defendant which 
had obtained a franchise from the state under section 536 of 
the Civil Code. In Matter of Keppelmann, 166 Cal. 770 
[138 P. 346], a municipal ordinance provided that writ-
ten permission had to be obtained from the board of public 
works before excavations could be made in streets occupied 
by a gas company for its pipes and conduits. This court 
held that the company's rights under the constitutional 
grant were .. not absolute" but subject to the direction of 
those in control of such streets. Rose v. State, 19 Ca1.2d 713, 
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730 [123 P.2d 505], involved inverse condemnation proceed-
ings; Archer v. City of Los AngeZes, 19 Ca1.2d 19 (119 P.2d 
1], was erroneously decided under the police power doctrine 
but in reality involved only inverse condemnation under 
article I, section 14, of the California Constitution. House v. 
Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 25 Ca1.2d 384 [153 
P.2d950]," involved an action in inverse condemnation for 
damages sustained by plaintiff because of the negligence of 
the defendant in the planning and construction of certain 
llood control channel work in the Los Angeles River. Tbis 
case in effect overruled the Archer case, BUpra. Hossom v. 
City of Long Beach, 83 Ca1.App.2d 745 [189 P.2d 787], in-
volved an action to redeem land which had been sold for 
delinquent taxes. City of Los AngeZes v. Klinke.r, 219 Cal. 
198 [25 P.2d 826, 90 A.L.R. 148], involved the condemnation 
of land for public uses and held that the buildings and other 
fixtures on the land must be considered in determining the 
owner's compensation. In Sacramento etc. Dist. v. Pacific 
G. ct E. Co., 72 Ca1.App.2d 638 [165 P.2d 741], a special 
proceeding in eminent domain under the Public Utilities Act. 
Company's arguments concerning statutory authority for 
payment of compensation for utility relocations are of no avail 
here and it is only necessary to point out that no such statu-
tory authority exists to cover the situation with which we are 
here concerned. 
For the foregoing reasons I am compelled to join with the 
majority and vote for a reversal of the judgment with direc-
tions to the trial court to enter judgment for the defendant 
city. 
McCOMB, J.-I "dissent. I would afBrm the judgment for 
the reasons stated by the District Court of Appeal in Southern 
California Gas Co. v. City of Los A.ngeles, (Ca1.App.) 318 
P.2d 735. 
'" 
<' Schauer, J.; concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied September 
24, 1958. Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
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under which the property was distributed entirely to the sur-
viving relative of the wife to the exclusion of relatives of the 
predeceased husband, is reversed, and the cause is remanded 
to the superior court with directions to enter a decree dis-
tributing the proceeds of the subject policy in accordance 
with the views hereinabove expressed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Spence, J., 
and McComb, J., concurred. 
